Confederate Cavalryman vs Union Cavalryman: Eastern Theater 1861-65 (Combat)
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This gripping study offers key insights into the tactics, leadership, combat performance, and subsequent reputations of Union and Confederate mounted units fighting in three pivotal cavalry actions of the Civil War - Second Bull Run/Manassas (1862), Buckland Mills (1863), and Tom's Brook (1864). During the intense, sprawling conflict that was the Civil War, both Union and Confederate forces fielded substantial numbers of cavalry, which carried out the crucial tasks of reconnaissance, raiding, and conveying messages. The perception was that cavalry's effectiveness on the battlefield would be drastically reduced in this age of improved mass infantry firepower. This book demonstrates how cavalry's lethal combination of mobility and dismounted firepower meant it was still very much a force to be reckoned with in battle. It also charts the swing in the qualitative difference of the cavalry forces fielded by the two sides as the war progressed, as the enormous initial superiority enjoyed by Confederate cavalry was gradually eroded, through the Union's outstanding improvements in training and tactics, and the bold and enterprising leadership of men such as Philip Sheridan.
Featuring full-color artwork, specially drawn maps, and archive illustrations.
shooting and running, cursing and cutting that followed cannot be understood except by an eye witness. (NT Oct 15, 1885: 4:5) Of the attempted Confederate countercharge Munford stated, “My regiment in line of battle going at a gallop, we went through the first line of the enemy and engaged part of the second. Here a terrible hand-to-hand fight ensued. The two commands were thoroughly intermingled, and the enemy overpowering us by numbers (being at least four to one), we were driven back” (OR I,
brigade, with Battery M, 2nd US Artillery, commanded by 1/Lt Alexander C. Pennington, to occupy the hills at Cerro Gordo, while the remainder approached the ford 1 mile below the town. Meanwhile, Davies’ brigade was massed in the woods along the eastern banks of the Run in preparation for an assault across the bridge. Soon after Stuart began receiving fire from Kilpatrick’s troops, a dispatch arrived from Fitzhugh Lee at Auburn stating that he was moving north to his support and suggesting a plan
cross the stream and ascertain, if possible, the strength and character of the enemy. After a determined effort of over two hours, General Custer had succeeded in pushing his command up to the bridge and on the hills to the right of the road overlooking the enemy’s position. The Seventh Michigan had already crossed Broad Run at the [Buckland Mill] ford, and was moving down upon the enemy’s flank with a strong line of skirmishers in advance. General Davies’ brigade was massed on the left of the
Becoming alarmed, Munford sent several couriers to the bivouac in rear of his lines before Rosser came to see the situation at first hand. When Rosser finally arrived at about 0715hrs he was informed that his small force could not possibly hold their position “against such odds.” Rosser responded, “I’ll drive them into Strasburg by ten o’clock,” prompting Munford to warn that the Confederate flank was “in the air” and could be turned, to which Rosser replied, “I’ll look out for that” (quoted in
Beckham) Breathed’s (Virginia) Battery (Stuart Horse Artillery, 1st Battery) (Capt J. Breathed); Chew’s (Virginia) Battery (Ashby Horse Artillery) (Capt R.P. Chew); Griffin’s (Maryland) Battery (2nd Maryland Artillery Company) (Capt W.H. Griffin); Hart’s (South Carolina) Battery (Washington Light Artillery) (Capt James F. Hart); McGregor’s (Virginia) Battery (Stuart Horse Artillery, 2nd Battery) (Capt W.M. McGregor); Moorman’s (Virginia) Battery (Lynchburg Horse Artillery) (Capt. M. N. Moorman).