Other Roads III: Additional Alternate Outcomes of the Second World War
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The third volume in the successful ‘Other Roads’ series, across 20 chapters concludes the considerations of alternate developments in the Second World War. It starts with Hitler being deported from Germany back to Austria in 1924 and continues through developments of the 1930s that would have altered the war to follow including a war between Germany and Poland over Danzig in 1933 and an active French response to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. It looks at a Soviet invasion of Norway and a Japanese invasion of the USSR. It considers the many ways in which the German advance into France could have been halted and conversely the impact Vichy France fighting actively for the Axis would have had. It looks at the British being more successful on Crete and at Arnhem but also losing the Battle of the Atlantic. It finishes looking at the potential for German jet-powered bombers and the impact on Europe of a Communist victory in Greece.
NOTE: 'Other Roads III' DOES NOT contain stories. It has chapters analysing different potential outcomes in history. It is closest in style to the ‘what if?’ collections edited by Peter Tsouras, Robert Crowley, Duncan Brack, Niall Ferguson and Andrew Roberts. It is suggested that you check them out if you are uncertain whether this one is the sort of book you are looking for.
The book draws on Alexander Rooksmoor’s two decades researching and teaching history and uses the analysis and debate into counter-factuals discussed down the years. It looks at both the detailed changes that could have occurred as well as much broader potential outcomes. This is a book that will fascinate anyone with an interest in why a central event of modern history unfolded the way it did. Anyone who has enjoyed the previous books will find ‘Other Roads III’ a strong, engaging addition to the series, that will undoubtedly stimulate fascinating controversy and debate.
from the bridge the units were supposed to be taking. The British faced an even tougher time. Before Operation Market Garden was put into effect the British received both signals and aerial reconnaissance intelligence regarding the SS Panzer Divisions in the area, especially around Arnhem. However, these concerns were dismissed. Only half the 1st Parachute Division could be dropped on the first day and then at landing sites at closest 8 Km (5 miles) from the bridge. Crossing this distance
the 20th September the Germans had been seeking to sever the route along which the armoured and infantry units had been advancing. An assault on the 22nd cut the road to Arnhem. Poles were slowly ferried across the river on the 22nd and 23rd to reinforce the British pocket The US 325th Glider Infantry Regiment finally arrived at Nijmegen, four days late. On the 23rd September the 4th Battalion of the Dorsetshire Regiment was also sent across to the British pocket but many wrongly landed into
While the Japanese lacked ammunition and equipment for a large portion of their forces, the casualties for Operation Downfall were estimated to be very high. MacArthur expected 23,000 casualties in 30 days of fighting and 125,000 if the fighting dragged on for three months. The staff of Fleet Admiral Ernest King (1878-1956) Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations estimated casualties of 31-41,000 in the first month; those of Admiral Chester Nimitz (1885-1966),
victorious. It forced Lüshun to surrender and occupied Korea and southern Manchuria. The Russians were defeated on land at Shenyang [Mukden] and at sea the Russian Baltic Fleet, which had sailed from Europe, was defeated in the Straits of Tsushima. The Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 gave Lüshun Japan; it also received the southern half of Sakhalin and protectorates over Korea and southern Manchuria. Japan gained control of the South Manchuria Railway from Lüshun to Changchun and, as was typical
adopted by the Germans. Similarly, in the mid-1930s, Charles De Gaulle had written and lectured on the flexible approach that he was to face in combat as Brigadier-General of the 4th Armoured Division in 1940. In contrast to the views of these men, who it must be accepted were either marginal to pre-war planning or were seen as eccentric, the French adopted a much more static approach to warfare, to some extent following the example of the middle period of the First World War. They had noted