Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed: Safeguarding the Future of Computing with Intel Embedded Security and Management Engine

Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed: Safeguarding the Future of Computing with Intel Embedded Security and Management Engine

Xiaoyu Ruan

Language: English

Pages: 272

ISBN: 143026571X

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed: Safeguarding the Future of Computing with Intel Embedded Security and Management Engine

Xiaoyu Ruan

Language: English

Pages: 272

ISBN: 143026571X

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed is an in-depth introduction to Intel’s platform embedded solution: the security and management engine. The engine is shipped inside most Intel platforms for servers, personal computers, tablets, and smartphones. The engine realizes advanced security and management functionalities and protects applications’ secrets and users’ privacy in a secure, light-weight, and inexpensive way. Besides native built-in features, it allows third-party software vendors to develop applications that take advantage of the security infrastructures offered by the engine.

Intel’s security and management engine is technologically unique and significant, but is largely unknown to many members of the tech communities who could potentially benefit from it. Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed reveals technical details of the engine. The engine provides a new way for the computer security industry to resolve critical problems resulting from booming mobile technologies, such as increasing threats against confidentiality and privacy. This book describes how this advanced level of protection is made possible by the engine, how it can improve users’ security experience, and how third-party vendors can make use of it.

It's written for computer security professionals and researchers; embedded system engineers; and software engineers and vendors who are interested in developing new security applications on top of Intel’s security and management engine.

It’s also written for advanced users who are interested in understanding how the security features of Intel’s platforms work.

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Confirms Unauthorized Access to Payment Card Data in U.S. Stores,” http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-confirms-unauthorized-access-to-payment-card-data-in-u-s-stores , accessed on June 10, 2014. 8.McAfee Labs, “Threat Advisory: EPOS Data Theft,” https://kc.mcafee.com/resources/sites/MCAFEE/content/live/PRODUCT_DOCUMENTATION/24000/PD24927/en_US/McAfee_Labs_Threat_Advisory_EPOS_Data_Theft.pdf , accessed on June 10, 2014. 9.Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Request for Comments 6520,

DMA engine is a key factor that makes the attack possible. To minimize the abuse of DMA, the firmware architecture should apply tighter control and exercise the security design principle of least privilege. Today, the security and management engine enforces stringent restrictions for applications accessing the host memory: The kernel’s DMA API is only open to applications that have justifiable need to access host memory. The white list of applications that are permitted to DMA with the host is

continuously making excessive requests may be considered to be misbehaving; a platform that repeatedly generates a constant signature for the same challenge is likely compromised, because per the EPID algorithm, multiple signatures generated for the same challenge should be different. The EPID signature allows the verifier to enforce an optional “based name” parameter so that all signatures generated by the same platform are linkable. The verifier can utilize this option to detect and identify

perspective, the field programmable fuse manager is implemented in its own task (container). See Chapter 4 of this book for more information about the security and management engine’s task isolation infrastructure. Being a dedicated task, other tasks are not able to penetrate the field programmable fuses. Firmware modules that own fuses can program or sense the fuses by calling the field programmable fuse task via the intertask calling mechanism supported by the kernel. The flow for programming

policy, its own security version number, and the security version numbers of the two manifests from the engine Verifying the integrity of the initial boot block using the manifests and OEM’s public key hash Notifying the engine of updating the security version numbers if necessary Enforcing boot policy in the event of a communication error or a time-out with the engine The security and management engine is responsible for the following: Reading OEM’s public key hash, boot policy, ACM security

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